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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, comedian and talk show host John Oliver ran a segment on 
Last Week Tonight discussing the rise of crisis pregnancy centers 
(CPCs).1  CPCs are nonprofits “posing as pseudo-medical facilities 
operated by anti-choice activists that aim to coerce women considering 
abortion into carrying their pregnancies to term.”2  On the show, Oliver 
played a segment of an interview of a rape victim who described in vivid 
detail the emotional distress she experienced after a CPC staff member 
provided unsolicited counseling as she walked to the abortion clinic next 
door.3  The segment was an all-too-real depiction of the deceptive 
practices taking place at these clinics. 
The deceptive marketing practices of CPCs lure low-income and 
marginalized women in the door.4  With the marked decrease of abortion 
clinics in America, women seeking health care have increasingly turned 
to CPCs5 without realizing the centers’ unstated goals.6  Oliver pointed 
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 1. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Crisis Pregnancy Centers (HBO television broadcast 
Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4NNpkv3Us1I [https://perma.cc/AVH4-E2LS] 
[hereinafter Last Week Tonight]. 
 2. NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.Y. FOUND., “SHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST 
CANCER,” A REPORT ON: THE LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS 
PREGNANCY CENTERS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2010), https://www.nirhealth.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/09/cpcreport2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB96-FF5R] [hereinafter NARAL REPORT]. 
 3. Last Week Tonight, supra note 1, at 6:09.  
 4. See Joanne D. Rosen, The Public Health Risks of Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 44 PERSP. ON 
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 201, 201 (2012). 
 5. See Ramiro Ferrando, While Abortion Clinics Diminish, Crisis Pregnancy Centers Flourish, 
MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Feb. 19, 2019), https://investigatemidwest.org 
/2019/02/19/while-abortion-clinics-diminish-crisis-pregnancy-centers-flourish/ [https://perma.cc 
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out several deceptive practices, many of which sound research has 
echoed.  The deceptive marketing practices include using language of the 
reproductive rights movement, referencing “choices,” “rights,” and 
“informed decisions” in advertisements,7 with targeted Google ads that 
populate when a person searches “abortion clinic.”8  Other deceptive 
tactics include: disguising the anti-abortion viewpoint of the CPC,9 
refusing to discuss abortion over the phone10—requiring women to visit 
the clinic before discussing abortion––and opening CPCs next to 
abortion clinics to draw in women seeking abortion services.11 
Once a woman walks into a CPC, the services it provides only 
hamper her ability to receive sound medical advice.  For example, many 
CPCs intentionally misread ultrasounds by incorrectly stating the 
gestational age of the fetus, potentially preventing a woman from seeking 
an abortion before time runs out in her state.12  Others misstate the 
abortion informed consent laws during counseling, making women 
believe they have more time to weigh the decision.13  Appointments have 
even been purposely delayed altogether so the fetus is closer to viability 
before the woman has an ultrasound that accurately states the fetus’s 
gestational age.14  This all occurs in a center that has the trappings of a 
 
/7676-TXTN] (noting that all but four states have a higher number of CPCs than abortion clinics). 
 6. See NARAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (“Hiding their anti-abortion agenda and giving the 
false impression of medical expertise serves the CPCs’ dual purpose of confusing, and thereby 
tricking, women who may be seeking a genuine medical facility, as well as legitimizing the 
inaccurate information and biased counseling these centers provide.”). 
 7. Id. at 7 (“The Crisis Pregnancy Center of New York website, for example, states, ‘You have 
the legal right to choose the outcome of your pregnancy.’” (quoting Options, CRISIS PREGNANCY 
CTR. OF N.Y., http://www.cpcny.org/options.htm [https://perma.cc/BUF6-JF8E])). 
 8. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS LIE: THE INSIDIOUS THREAT TO 
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 4 (2015), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04 
/cpc-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JD5-W38U]; see also Last Week Tonight, supra note 1, at 
5:41. 
 9. NARAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (“Approximately 75% of investigated CPCs fail to 
disclose their anti-choice agenda on their websites, thereby misleading unsuspecting women who 
may think they are going to visit a clinic that offers medically accurate and unbiased comprehensive 
reproductive health information and services.”). 
 10. Id. at 7 (“Volunteer investigators reported that, on the phone, the CPCs were welcoming 
and seemed eager to get the caller to come in for an appointment. . . .  None mentioned abortion 
unless asked; once asked, most said they did not recommend or refer for abortion.”). 
 11. Id.   
 12. Last Week Tonight, supra note 1, at 10:34. 
 13. See, e.g., NARAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 (“[W]hen a volunteer investigator posing as 
a woman who was 9.3 weeks pregnant asked a counselor at the EMC Pregnancy Center in the Bronx 
how long she had to make a decision, the counselor told her that ‘in this country you can get an 
abortion up to nine months’ and ‘you’ve got time to think about it.’  In reality, abortion is prohibited 
after the point of fetal viability unless a woman’s life or health is in danger or if the fetus is not 
viable.”). 
 14. See S. MALIA RICHMOND-CRUM & MELISSA KLEDER, NARAL PRO-CHOICE MD. FUND, 
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doctor’s office,15 where one reasonably expects to be apprised of all the 
facts in a nonjudgmental manner. 
These deceptive practices are reinforced in the rhetoric CPC 
proponents utilize and the documents staff rely on for counseling to push 
their hidden anti-abortion agenda.  For instance, one proponent, 
Heartbeat International, provides a handbook for CPCs that contains 
inaccuracies about the risk of abortion, such as an increased risk of 
suicide, infertility, and breast cancer.16  Abby Johnson, an anti-abortion 
activist, revealed the deceptive intentions of CPCs when she spoke at the 
Heartbeat International Annual Conference in 2012: “We want to appear 
neutral on the outside.  The best client you ever get is one that thinks 
they’re walking into an abortion clinic.  Okay?  Those are the best clients 
that could ever walk in your door or call your center—the ones that think 
you provide abortions.”17  These deceptive practices are intentionally 
employed to reduce the availability of abortion and advance the anti-
abortion agenda.  At the heart of this issue is the disconnect between 
those who view abortion as morally wrong,18 and those who view 
abortion as a medical procedure, with the expectation that any clinic 
specializing in pregnancy services should be held to medical standards. 
Despite the dangers of these deceptive marketing tactics, few states 
 
MARYLAND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER INVESTIGATIONS: THE TRUTH REVEALED (2008), https:// 
maryland.prochoiceamericaaffiliates.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/04/crisispregnancycenter 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9LA-9TSV] (“CPCs purposefully schedule sonogram appointments 
two-three weeks after the initial appointment to ensure that there will be a heartbeat and that the 
pregnancy is larger than a grain of rice.”). 
 15. See NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS: AN AFFRONT TO CHOICE 4 
(2006), https://www.prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/cpc_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FCK 
-XFF8] (“CPCs often design their facilities to look like actual health care facilities with a waiting 
room, a partitioned check-in desk, and an ultrasound machine.”); see also Last Week Tonight, supra 
note 1, at 9:14 (explaining that CPCs mislead women by branding themselves as healthcare 
facilities); Vice News, The Fake Abortion Clinics of America: Misconception, YOUTUBE (Sept. 17, 
2014),  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-ex4Q-z-is [https://perma.cc/LUC4-85B4] 
(documenting CPCs mispresenting themselves as healthcare facilities). 
 16. Last Week Tonight, supra note 1, at 8:15; see also NARAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 
(“Nearly every CPC investigated provided misleading—or sometimes entirely false—information 
about abortion, either through websites, written materials, or counseling sessions.  They portrayed 
abortion as a painful, dangerous procedure that leads to a range of physical and emotional damage: 
future infertility, higher risk of breast cancer, ‘post-abortion syndrome,’ and other health 
complications, including sexual dysfunction, infection, cervical scarring, and death.”).  
 17. Last Week Tonight, supra note 1, at 3:18. 
 18. See, e.g., Timothy Brahm, John Oliver’s Lies About Abby Johnson and Crisis Pregnancy 
Centers, EQUAL RIGHTS INST. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2018), https://blog.equalrightsinstitute.com/john 
-olivers-lies-about-abby-johnson-and-crisis-pregnancy-centers/ [https://perma.cc/7BYE-TPA2] (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2020) (criticizing Oliver’s view of CPCs and defending the centers’ tactics).  Abby 
Johnson does not view these tactics as deceptive.  Id.  Anti-abortion activists allege that they view 
these tactics as efforts to “do everything we can while remaining moral to try to get abortion-minded 
women into the center.”  Id. 
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regulate or have attempted to regulate CPCs19 and some states, including 
Kansas, endorse CPCs.20  California was one of the states that attempted 
to regulate CPCs.  In 2015, California passed the Reproductive Freedom 
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act21 (FACT 
Act) to inform low-income women who enter CPCs of their options.22  
The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates––an organization 
that operates over 1,400 CPCs––and two California CPCs challenged the 
FACT Act on First Amendment grounds in National Institute of Family 
and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA).23  The NIFLA Court held that 
strict scrutiny presumptively applies to content-based laws that regulate 
speech, with only two narrow exceptions.  The Court found that the 
petitioners were likely to succeed on the merits, signaling the lower court 
to issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the FACT Act.24  NIFLA may 
have far-reaching implications for not only disclosure requirements in 
the abortion context but also disclosure requirements writ large.25  The 
logic behind NIFLA perpetuates a paternalistic ideology aiming to 
dissuade women from seeking abortion services,26 and adopts a standard 
that is not evenhandedly applied to abortion providers’ First Amendment 
 
 19. Are We a Medical Clinic?, HEARTBEAT INT’L, https://www.heartbeatinternational.org/are 
-we-a-medical-clinic [https://perma.cc/Y7TW-TZPJ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (listing California, 
New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey as the only four states that regulate, or have attempted to 
regulate, CPCs); see also Crisis Pregnancy Centers, REWIRE.NEWS, https://rewire.news/legislative 
-tracker/law-topic/crisis-pregnancy-centers/ [https://perma.cc/J24G-7TTK] (last updated Sept. 12, 
2018) (“In 2009, Baltimore became the first city to enact an ordinance requiring limited-service 
pregnancy centers to post signs in their waiting rooms indicating that such centers do not provide or 
make referrals for abortion or birth-control services.  A similar ordinance was passed in 
Montgomery County, Maryland, requiring centers to post signs indicating the lack of licensed 
medical providers on staff.  Both ordinances were later blocked by federal courts.  Similar local 
ordinances in Texas and New York have also been blocked and/or revised in court.”). 
 20. See S. Con. Res. 1606, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013) (enacted). 
 21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473 (West Supp. 2018). 
 22. See A.B. 775, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess., §1(a) (Cal. 2015) (“All California women, 
regardless of income, should have access to reproductive health services.  The state provides 
insurance coverage of reproductive health care and counseling to eligible, low-income women. . . .  
Because pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, California 
must supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs.”). 
 23. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 (2018). 
 24. Id. at 2378. 
 25. See id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s approach “threatens 
considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government 
regulation”). 
 26. See Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws 
Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence in Casey and since touches on informed consent principles and women’s 
autonomy.  Apparent in these decisions is a troubling strain of paternalism and distrust of women’s 
decision-making ability.”). 
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rights.27 
This Comment analyzes First Amendment principles that apply to 
compelled physician speech and argues that NIFLA must apply evenly to 
all state-mandated disclosures and uphold only regulations based in fact 
that are sufficiently tied to medical treatment and that a patient would 
want to know before making a medical decision.  Adding the element of 
what a reasonable patient would want to know––an informed consent 
requirement––to the NIFLA standard would require state-mandated 
disclosure laws to apply with equal force to the medical providers who 
offer abortions and those who do not, resolving the inequity NIFLA 
implies.  This Comment further argues that, while strict scrutiny is not 
necessarily fatal in fact, the FACT Act does not survive strict scrutiny.  
This result, while seemingly unfavorable, offers a path for successfully 
challenging abortion informed consent laws as unconstitutional 
compelled speech requiring physicians to espouse the controversial and 
ideological views of the state. 
Part II traces the legal context, history, and current status of the 
informed consent doctrine.  It then puts the informed consent doctrine 
into perspective and discusses the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.  Next, 
it summarizes informed consent in the context of a medical provider’s 
First Amendment free speech concerns.  Finally, Part II discusses NIFLA 
and the inequities it creates. 
Section III.A argues that states may pass protective measures to 
safeguard patients who may otherwise be uninformed or disadvantaged.  
It begins by unwrapping the rule set forth in NIFLA and argues that the 
Supreme Court overlooked precedent and adopted a rule that obscures 
precedent.  Section III.B then explains that, despite NIFLA’s recognition 
of only two narrow exceptions to the general rule that strict scrutiny 
applies to content-based regulations, strict scrutiny is not necessarily 
fatal.28  The FACT Act, however, is not narrowly tailored to achieve 
California’s compelling interest in protecting pregnant people because it 
is too broad. 
Section III.C applies the NIFLA standard to informed consent 
 
 27. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If a State can lawfully require a doctor 
to tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services,” as in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, “why should it not be able, as here, to require a medical 
counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive healthcare about childbirth and 
abortion services?”).  
 28. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (finding a content-based regulation of 
speech passed a strict scrutiny standard of review); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010) (finding a content-based regulation of speech that limited “forms of 
support . . . to terrorist organizations” passed strict scrutiny). 
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statutes in effect in Kansas, South Dakota, and Indiana.29  These 
informed consent laws are good examples of the controversial disclosure 
requirements states impose on abortion providers.  This Section argues 
that these informed consent laws are state ideological speech 
masquerading as medically necessary information and if challenged, 
strict scrutiny would apply and the statutes would fail.  Next, it argues 
that NIFLA gives physicians a leg to stand on to invalidate ideological 
abortion informed consent laws.  Lastly, Section III.D proposes a redraft 
of the relevant section of the Reproductive FACT Act to comply with 
NIFLA. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A society concerned with the politics of reproductive rights rather 
than medical ethics has fostered the emergence of CPCs and increased 
legislative abortion restrictions.30  Many states have enacted burdensome 
and medically unnecessary regulations on abortion providers––
regulations not imposed on other medical professionals.31  Commonly 
referred to as TRAP (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) laws, 
these regulations are designed to shut down abortion clinics and impede 
access to abortion.32  CPCs, on the other hand, are vastly 
underregulated.33  This Part discusses the history of informed consent 
laws and the tactics CPCs use to disguise their anti-abortion stance under 
 
 29. Dennis Carter, Kansas Republicans Scramble to Override ‘Fundamental’ Right to Abortion: 
Spotlight on the States (Updated), REWIRE.NEWS (Feb. 7, 2020, 5:34 PM), https://rewire.news 
/article/2020/02/03/kansas-republicans-fundamental-right-abortion-spotlight-on-the-states/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KCJ4-5Q3W]. 
 30. See Rosen, supra note 4, at 201–03 (explaining that CPCs often misinform low-income 
women about contraception and abortion, and noting that to combat the negative effects of this 
information, states could enforce “state consumer protections laws that prohibit false advertising or 
deceptive practices by service providers” and “[h]ealth departments could disseminate clear and 
detailed information about the contraceptive, abortion, pregnancy, and STD services available at the 
centers, as well as the actual risks related to abortion and the likelihood of those risks”). 
 31. TRAP Laws, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/issue/trap-laws/ 
[https://perma.cc/2Q54-UZUT] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (listing states that subject abortion 
providers to restrictions not imposed on other medical professionals).  
 32. Id.; see Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (2016) (noting that 
Texas regulations of abortion clinics requiring admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical centers 
standards caused almost half of the state’s abortion centers to close). 
 33. CPCs are only subject to certain applicable regulations, such as HIPAA, if the center is a 
licensed medical provider.  Amy G. Bryant & Jonas J. Swartz, Why Crisis Pregnancy Centers Are 
Legal but Unethical, 20 AMA J. ETHICS 269, 271 (2018).  Most CPCs, however, are not licensed 
medical providers.  Id.  Further, CPC speech has proven difficult to regulate because laws imposing 
disclosure requirements on CPCs must comply with the First Amendment.  Id.; see also Rosen, 
supra note 4, at 203 (finding that the majority of state legislation seeking to regulate deceptive 
practices of CPCs have been the subject of litigation and invalidated on First Amendment grounds). 
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the guise of informed consent.  Then, this Part examines the Supreme 
Court’s abortion and free speech jurisprudence, setting the stage for 
NIFLA.  Lastly, it summarizes NIFLA and highlights the inequities in the 
holding. 
A. Informed Consent 
Today, CPCs far outnumber abortion clinics.34  This would not 
necessarily be a problem if CPCs offered factual and comprehensive 
advice about abortion.  While CPCs claim to provide the marginalized 
women who seek their services with accurate information about their 
healthcare options,35 however, these centers frequently “provide 
inaccurate information that may delay or interfere with women’s access 
to abortion and contraceptive services, improperly influence women’s 
reproductive health decisions and potentially increase the number of 
unintended births.”36  These deceptive practices violate the ethical 
standard of informed consent. 
1. History and Current Definition 
The informed consent doctrine has its origins in medical ethics and 
common law torts.37  The concept of informed consent first arose in the 
context of battery cases.38  Early cases recognized a person’s right to 
have “complete immunity of [their] person from medical interference of 
others.”39  As Justice Cardozo announced in the landmark decision of 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, “[e]very human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
damages.”40  The right, however, was solely a right of refusal––the early 
 
 34. See Brittany A. Campbell, Note, The Crisis Inside Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop 
These Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 
73, 79 (2017) (“Nationwide, CPCs outnumber legitimate abortion clinics three-to-one . . . .”).  
 35. NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, supra note 15, at 8. 
 36. Rosen, supra note 4, at 201. 
 37. Margaret E. Swain, The Essentials of Informed Consent: What ART Clients Don’t Know 
Can Hurt Them!, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 18, 19 (2011). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (battery claim against a physician for 
operating on the wrong ear without the patient’s consent); see also Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 
166 (1905) (“[T]he free citizen’s first and greatest right, which underlies all others—the right to the 
inviolability of [their] person . . . .”), aff’d, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). 
 40. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
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cases did not recognize the right to disclosure of additional information.41  
Over time, courts began to apply negligence concepts, rather than 
intentional tort concepts, viewing the failure to provide informed consent 
as a breach of the physician’s duty to their patient, rather than a claim 
rooted in battery, and a duty to inform the patient of the risks and 
benefits emerged as a requirement.42 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines informed consent as “[a] patient’s 
knowing choice about a medical treatment or procedure, made after a 
physician or other healthcare provider discloses whatever information a 
reasonably prudent provider in the medical community would give to a 
patient regarding the risks involved in the proposed treatment or 
procedure.”43  The informed consent doctrine places responsibility on the 
medical provider to rise to the standard of a reasonable and prudent 
professional.44  The corollary in the medical community is substantively 
the same.45 
The informed consent process consists of three elements: (1) 
communication of sufficient information regarding the risks, benefits, 
and alternatives;46 (2) comprehension of the conveyed information;47 and 
 
 41. Swain, supra note 37, at 19–20. 
 42. Id.; see also Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of Physician 
Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 561–62 (2000) (“The doctrine of informed consent provides 
patients with two causes of action against a treating physician: one for providing treatment without 
any consent, and another for failing to sufficiently disclose treatment information to allow for truly 
informed consent. . . .  To plead a claim for failure to disclose treatment information, a patient must 
allege that: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose the particular information; (2) the physician 
breached this duty; and (3) the physician’s breach caused an injury to the patient.”). 
 43. Informed Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 44. See Gatter, supra note 42, at 566 (“The prudent physician standard requires physicians to 
disclose information that a reasonably prudent physician in the same or similar circumstances would 
disclose.”).  
 45. See Informed Consent, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics 
/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/B8RZ-PEVL] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Informed 
Consent, AM. MED. ASS’N] (“The process of informed consent occurs when communication between 
a patient and physician results in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a specific 
medical intervention.  In seeking a patient’s informed consent . . . physicians should: (a) Assess the 
patient’s ability to understand relevant medical information and the implications of treatment 
alternatives and to make an independent, voluntary decision[;] (b) Present relevant information 
accurately and sensitively, in keeping with the patient’s preferences for receiving medical 
information.”). 
 46. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont 
-report-508c_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6556-9BK2] (“Relevant risks and benefits must be 
thoroughly arrayed in documents and procedures used in the informed consent process.”). 
 47. Id. (“Even when some direct benefit to them is anticipated, the subjects should understand 
clearly the range of risk and the voluntary nature of participation.”). 
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(3) subsequent voluntary consent to treatment.48  Critically, in 
communicating such information, a physician may not withhold material 
facts or de-emphasize the known risks of a procedure to induce 
consent.49  In practice, informed consent takes place during a 
conversation between a medical provider and a patient, which can be 
reinforced with a document.50  The medical provider may then record the 
date informed consent took place and to follow internal protocols.51 
Informed consent principles, long recognized at common law,52 have 
also been adopted in state statutes,53 which occasionally even make the 
failure to obtain informed consent before an abortion a crime.54 While 
informed consent is a requirement for all medical treatment, most state 
informed consent statutes regulate abortion and provide stricter 
requirements for abortions than any other medical procedure.55 
2. State Informed Consent Laws 
States uniformly recognize a need for medical providers to obtain 
informed consent from patients before any medical intervention.56  
Statutory requirements for informed consent in the abortion context vary 
from state to state.57  Some statutes require disclosure of medically 
 
 48. Id. (“This element of informed consent requires conditions free of coercion and undue 
influence.”). 
 49. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
 50. DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, 1 ATTORNEYS MEDICAL DESKBOOK § 10:70 (4th ed. 2008 & 2019 
Supp.). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 
S.W.3d 685, 690 (Mo. 2006). 
 53. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (West, Westlaw through Laws 2020, Act 322) 
(requiring informed consent in surgical procedures that involve “general anesthesia, spinal 
anesthesia, or major regional anesthesia or any person who undergoes an amniocentesis diagnostic 
procedure or a diagnostic procedure which involves the intravenous or intraductal injection of a 
contrast material”); 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess.) (“[A] physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain . . . informed consent.”). 
 54. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.2 (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (“A physician 
who, knowingly or in reckless disregard, violates § 34-23A-2.1, 34-23A-7, or 34-23A-10.1 is guilty 
of a Class 2 misdemeanor.”). 
 55. Kali Ann Trahanas, Comment, How the Undue Burden Standard Is Eroding Informed 
Consent, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 231, 239 (2013). 
 56. For a survey of informed consent cases across the country, see Laurent B. Frantz, 
Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of 
Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3d 1008 (1978 & Supp. 2020). 
 57. See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, 
Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 111–14 (2008) (discussing the 
various state requirements for physicians obtaining informed consent). 
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inaccurate information58 and information entirely unrelated to the 
abortion procedure.  These requirements seek to add weight to a 
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy, such as making the fetal 
heartbeat audible,59 mandatory waiting periods,60 and ultrasounds.61  
States requiring abortion providers to first conduct an ultrasound do not 
expressly require the use of a transvaginal ultrasound, but many require 
that the ultrasound image contain a level of detail that only a transvaginal 
ultrasound can achieve at early gestational stages.62  In practice, these 
ultrasound requirements thus frequently subject women unnecessarily to 
invasive transvaginal ultrasounds.63 
Some states, such as Kansas, push the definition of informed consent 
even further to require that abortion providers provide information on the 
gestational age of the fetus, fetal development throughout pregnancy, and 
fetal pain.64  Some statutes that require the provider to display and 
describe the ultrasound image regardless of the patient’s wishes, often 
termed “speech and display” laws, have been enjoined on free speech 
grounds.65  The current informed consent landscape has been irrefutably 
shaped by anti-abortion activists who do not intend to make a woman 
more informed in her medical decision.  Rather, the intention is to inform 
 
 58. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion [https:// 
perma.cc/8AM6-KA6K] (last updated Apr. 1, 2020).  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
6709(a)(1)(3), (b)(5) (West 2018) (requiring physicians to disclose, among other risks, the risk to 
breast cancer and future infertility and to disclose that the “abortion will terminate the life of a 
whole, separate, unique, living human being”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (requiring patients to be informed of “[t]he particular medical 
risks associated with the particular abortion procedure . . . including, when medically accurate, the 
risks of infection, hemorrhage and breast cancer, and the danger to subsequent pregnancies and 
infertility”). 
 59. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 
2019 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-745.14 (West, Westlaw through 57th 2d Reg. 
Sess.). 
 60. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 58. 
 61. See Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state 
-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound [https://perma.cc/GF8P-YUQ2] (last updated Apr. 1, 2020). 
 62.  Forced Ultrasound, REWIRE.NEWS, https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/forced 
-ultrasound/ [https://perma.cc/A8JR-GMTV] (last updated Sept. 12, 2018). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 58; see also infra Section III.C.1. 
 65. See, e.g., Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 428 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (granting preliminary 
injunction on the grounds that the speech-and-display requirements of North Carolina’s Right to 
Know Act “violate[d] the First Amendment by compelling unwilling speakers to deliver the state’s 
message discouraging abortion” and the state failed to show these requirements furthered a 
compelling state interest).  The Oklahoma Supreme Court also struck Oklahoma’s speech-and-
display law, but on alternate grounds.  See Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012). 
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women on subjective religious choices66 and to “put a face on that baby 
[that] humanizes this process and really allows the mother to connect”67 
in order to discourage her from choosing abortion.68 
3. Crisis Pregnancy Centers and Informed Consent 
CPCs envision “an abortion-free America.”69  To accomplish this tall 
task, large Christian nonprofits support CPCs by providing legal 
resources and protection.70  Some CPCs provide several services for 
free.71  Those services often come at a high cost to marginalized women 
because CPCs intentionally mislead pregnant women with inaccurate 
information that may delay them from receiving unbiased obstetrical 
care, access to abortion and contraception, or information about federal 
and state benefit programs.72  CPCs, which do everything in their power 
to dissuade patients from obtaining an abortion, have been the subject of 
 
 66. See, e.g., Our Commitment, HEARTBEAT INT’L, https://www.heartbeatinternational.org 
/about/our-commitment [https://perma.cc/ZQ4E-F2BL] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020) (“All Heartbeat 
International policies and materials are consistent with Biblical principles and with orthodox 
Christian . . . ethical principles and teaching on the dignity of the human person and sanctity of 
human life.”); About NIFLA, NAT’L INST. OF FAMILY & LIFE ADVOCATES, https://nifla.org/about 
-nifla/ [https://perma.cc/Z2XM-7XD6] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020) (describing itself as a “faith-based 
nonprofit . . . seek[ing] to advance the cause and culture of life in America”).  
 67. Kevin Sack, In Ultrasound, Abortion Fight Has New Front, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/health/policy/28ultrasound.html [https://perma.cc/6ZT9 
-TWC7] (quoting Carrie Gordon Earll, a spokesperson for Focus on the Family). 
 68. See, e.g., Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (describing North 
Carolina’s Woman’s Right to Know Act as “an effort by the state to require health care providers to 
deliver information in support of the state’s philosophic and social position discouraging abortion 
and encouraging childbirth”), aff’d sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 69. About NIFLA, supra note 66. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., INSIGHT WOMEN’S CTR., http://insightlawrence.org [https://perma.cc/8N4L 
-H8KM] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020); see also About Advice & Aid Pregnancy Centers: Your 
Pregnancy Center . . . Your Friend, ADVICE & AID, https://adviceandaid.com/advice-aid/ 
[https://perma.cc/ED4U-EWDX] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). 
 72. See Last Week Tonight, supra note 1, at 8:13 (discussing the misleading information and 
delay tactics CPCs use to dissuade women from choosing abortion); Campbell, supra note 34, at 77–
78 (stating that CPCs target “vulnerable pregnant women” to lure them into their facilities where 
they then “intentionally disseminate misleading and often false information”).  While the Hyde 
Amendment to the Medicaid Act limits the use of Medicaid funding for abortions, the current 
version of the amendment allocates funding for abortions when “the pregnancy is the result of an act 
of rape or incest” or when the pregnancy “place[s] the woman in danger of death unless an abortion 
is performed,”  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 508, 123 Stat. 3034, 
3280 (2009).  For an overview of the Hyde Amendment and its impact on women, see Maggie Astor, 
What Is the Hyde Amendment? A Look at Its Impact as Biden Reverses His Stance, N.Y. TIMES (June 
7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/us/politics/what-is-the-hyde-amendment.html 
[https://perma.cc/SHC2-HXBH]. 
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extensive litigation for deceptive trade practices,73 civil rights 
violations,74 and intentional infliction of emotional distress.75 
B. The Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence demonstrates the 
standard of review has evolved from a strict scrutiny standard to the 
undue burden test, which minimized the right to abortion to a type of 
intermediate standard subject to state regulation.  The Court in NIFLA 
continued to minimize abortions rights via the First Amendment.  In Roe 
v. Wade,76 the Supreme Court recognized that the fundamental right to 
privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
encompasses the right to terminate a pregnancy.77  The Court held that 
the Constitution protects the right to terminate a pregnancy before 
viability.78  Because the Court declared that abortion is a fundamental 
right, it determined that regulations limiting the right to abortion are 
subject to strict scrutiny.79  To pass strict scrutiny, regulations limiting 
abortion needed to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state 
interest.80  Roe found that the state has an interest in protecting maternal 
health and in protecting potential life––interests that become 
“compelling” as a pregnancy progresses.81  To balance the state’s 
interests against the woman’s fundamental right, Roe established a 
trimester framework to assess regulations limiting abortion.82  During the 
first trimester, the state could not regulate abortions.83  After the first 
 
 73. See, e.g., Mother & Unborn Baby Care of N. Tex., Inc. v. State, 749 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. 
App. 1988) (holding that a CPC violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Fargo Women’s 
Health Org. v. FM Women’s Help & Caring Connection, 444 N.W.2d 683, 683–84 (N.D. 1989) 
(holding that an abortion clinic could bring a false advertising claim for damages against a CPC), 
overruled by Trade ‘N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Ams., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 2001). 
 74. See, e.g., Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 917 
F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming by an equally divided court the district court’s finding that 
women seeking abortions did not constitute a protected class for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). 
 75. See, e.g., Boes v. Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205, 208–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a 
woman’s allegation that the CPC forced her to watch a graphic film featuring mutilated late term 
abortion fetuses before she could view the results of her pregnancy test sufficiently stated a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 77. Id. at 153. 
 78. Id. at 163–64. 
 79. Id. at 155–56. 
 80. Id. at 155. 
 81. Id. at 162–63. 
 82. Id. at 164–65. 
 83. Id. at 164. 
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trimester, the state could regulate the abortion procedure.  During the 
second trimester, the state could regulate, but not outlaw, abortions to 
protect maternal health.84  But during the third trimester, at which point 
the fetus is viable, the state could regulate and even prohibit abortions to 
promote its interest in potential life, except where necessary to save the 
woman’s life.85 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,86 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed “Roe’s essential holding” that previability 
bans on abortion are unconstitutional.87  The Casey plurality, however,  
abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of review required by Roe and 
replaced it with the “undue burden” test.88  The undue burden test strikes 
down as unconstitutional an abortion regulation if it “has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion [previability].”89  The plurality also rejected Roe’s trimester 
framework to promote the state’s interest in protecting potential life.90  
The Court then applied this standard to the Pennsylvania statute at issue.  
The Court found that the twenty-four-hour waiting period, with 
emergency exceptions, and the requirement of parental consent for 
minors, with a judicial bypass exception, did not place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking abortion.91  With regard to the 
physician required disclosure, the Court concluded that while “the 
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated,” this 
was “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State” and no evidence was presented to 
demonstrate “that requiring a doctor to give the required information 
would amount to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
abortion.”92  The plurality, however, struck down the spousal notice 
requirement as unconstitutional because it placed an “undue burden on a 
woman’s choice.”93 
After Casey, the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart applied the undue 
burden test to strike down a Nebraska statute criminalizing so-called 
 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 164–65. 
 86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 87. Id. at 845–46. 
 88. Id. at 869–77 (plurality opinion). 
 89. Id. at 877. 
 90. Id. at 876. 
 91. Id. at 885–87, 899. 
 92. Id. at 838. 
 93. Id. at 901. 
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partial birth abortions.94  In particular, the Court reiterated the 
longstanding requirement that postviability abortion bans must contain 
an exception preserving maternal health––an exception the Nebraska 
statute lacked.95  Even if the statute had recognized this exception, 
however, the statute still created an undue burden because it applied 
broadly to not only the dilation and extraction procedure but also to the 
dilation and evacuation procedure, “thereby unduly burdening the right 
to choose abortion itself.”96 
In dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for the lack of 
deference to state interests,97 but the majority emphasized that “a State 
may promote but not endanger a woman’s health when it regulates the 
method of abortion.”98  Justice Kennedy added that the Court in Casey 
recognized “the physician’s ability to practice medicine was ‘subject to 
reasonable . . . regulation by the State’ and would receive the ‘same 
solicitude it receives in other contexts.’”99  And in other contexts, Justice 
Kennedy argued, states are “entitled to make judgments where high 
medical authority is in disagreement.”100  Stenberg drew an important 
line, distinguishing medical regulations from laws that operate to burden 
a woman seeking an abortion by holding the Nebraska partial birth 
abortion ban unconstitutional. 
In Gonzales v. Carhart,101 the Court assessed the constitutionality of 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal statute banning all 
dilation and evacuation procedures resulting in the delivery of “a living 
fetus.”102  Like the Nebraska statute at issue in Stenberg, the Act also 
contained no exception for safeguarding the woman’s health.103  
Nevertheless, Gonzales upheld the Act under the undue burden 
 
 94. 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).  The term “partial birth abortion” was coined by the National 
Right to Life Committee, an anti-abortion group, to describe what the medical community calls the 
dilation and extraction (D & X) procedure.  Megan K. Donovan, D&E Abortion Bans: The 
Implications of Banning the Most Common Second-Trimester Procedure, 20 GUTTMACHER POL’Y 
REV. 35, 36 (2017).  
 95. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921, 930 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).  
 96. Id. at 930 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 874).   
 97. Id. at 969–70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 931 (majority opinion) (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 
191–92 (1973)). 
 99. Id. at 969 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884). 
 100. Id. at 970. 
 101. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 102. Id. at 142.  
 103. See id. at 143. 
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standard.104  In upholding the Act, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, adopted the position he argued for in his Stenberg dissent.105 
The Court explained: “The question becomes whether the Act can 
stand when this medical uncertainty persists.  The Court’s precedents 
instruct that the Act can survive this facial attack.  The Court has given 
state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas 
where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”106  In light of this 
uncertainty, Congress was entitled to deference in its factfinding that 
prohibiting dilation and evacuation procedures in this way did not pose 
any significant health risks, allowing the government’s asserted interest 
to prevail.107  The Gonzales dissent criticized the majority for departing 
from Casey and Stenberg.108  Further, the dissent pointed to sound 
medical evidence in the record that undermined the majority’s argument 
that there was any medical uncertainty.109 
The inconsistent application of the undue burden test in Stenberg and 
Gonzales,110 resulting from the Court’s failure to provide a systematic 
methodology for determining when an “undue burden” on abortion 
exists,111 set the stage for the Court in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt to offer clarification.112  In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court 
made clear that the undue burden test requires balancing the burdens and 
benefits of an abortion regulation to determine whether an undue burden 
 
 104. Id. at 168. 
 105. Trahanas, supra note 55, at 253.  
 106. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163. 
 107. Id. at 164. 
 108. See id. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is alarming.  It refuses to 
take Casey and Stenberg seriously.  It tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban 
nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).  It blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between 
previability and postviability abortions.  And, for the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a 
prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health.”). 
 109. Id. at 176 (“[T]he congressional record includes letters from numerous individual 
physicians stating that pregnant women’s health would be jeopardized under the Act, as well as 
statements from nine professional associations, including ACOG, the American Public Health 
Association, and the California Medical Association, attesting that intact D & E carries meaningful 
safety advantages over other methods. . . .  No comparable medical groups have supported the 
ban.”). 
 110. As a result, lower courts have also deeply struggled to apply the undue burden test.  See 
Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in Undue 
Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2013) (“[T]he correct method of implementing 
that test remains murky.  Consequently, courts have applied Casey inconsistently and unfaithfully, 
creating a tangled body of abortion precedent and rendering the undue burden standard insufficient 
to protect women’s reproductive autonomy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 111. Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025 (1994). 
 112. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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exists.113  The Court applied this balance to find that two provisions of a 
Texas abortion law––an admitting-privileges provision and a surgical-
center provision––did not “confer[] medical benefits sufficient to justify 
the burdens upon access [to abortion] that each impose[d].”114  These 
burdens, the Court concluded, posed “a substantial obstacle in the path of 
women seeking a previability abortion,” and thus constituted an undue 
burden on the constitutional right to abortion.115 
In finding that the admitting privileges requirement conferred no 
health benefits, the Court pointed to the district court’s findings that, 
inter alia, (1) before the passage of the Texas law, abortion was 
“extremely safe,” with “particularly low rates of serious complications 
and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure,”116 and (2) 
when complications do occur, they rarely require hospital admission.117  
Further, evidence in the record demonstrated that the admitting privileges 
requirement forced about half of Texas’s abortion clinics to close.118  
These closures translated into fewer abortion providers, significant wait 
times, and overcrowding at remaining clinics.119  The Court found no 
evidence in the record showing that the Texas law advanced the state’s 
legitimate interest in protecting women’s health. 
Similarly, the surgical-center requirement provided no “better care or 
experience,”120 because: 
Nationwide, childbirth is 14 times more likely than abortion to result in 
death, but Texas law allows a midwife to oversee childbirth in the 
patient’s own home.  Colonoscopy, a procedure that typically takes 
place outside a hospital (or surgical center) setting, has a mortality rate 
10 times higher than an abortion. . . .  And Texas partly or wholly 
grandfathers . . . about two-thirds of the facilities to which the surgical-
center standards apply.  But it neither grandfathers nor provides 
waivers for any of the facilities that perform abortions.  These facts 
indicate that the surgical-center provision imposes “a requirement that 
 
 113. Id. at 2309. 
 114. Id. at 2299. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2302 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 
2014)). 
 117. Id. at 2311 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684). 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. (“Record evidence [] supports the finding that after the admitting-privileges provision 
went into effect, the ‘number of women of reproductive age living in a county . . . more than 150 
miles from a provider increased from approximately 86,000 to 400,000 . . . and the number 
of women living in a county more than 200 miles from a provider from approximately 10,000 to 
290,000.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681)).  
 120. Id. at 2315 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684). 
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simply is not based on differences” between abortion and other surgical 
procedures “that are reasonably related to” preserving women’s health, 
the asserted “purpos[e] of the Act in which it is found.”121 
The Court then explained that the surgical-center requirement was 
arbitrary, and there was no evidence to the contrary.122  The Court found 
the surgical-center requirement, like the admitting-privileges 
requirement, placed a “substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions,” 
creating an “undue burden” on the constitutional right to choose 
abortion.123 
C. The Physician’s Free Speech 
Free speech, a core tenet of American society, is vital to democratic 
self-governance and the search for truth.124  The First Amendment 
protects free speech to safeguard speakers and listeners alike from 
“government-compelled ideological speech.”125  Government-compelled 
ideological speech in the medical field is especially dangerous because it 
“undermine[s] the integrity of the medical profession as a whole and its 
ability to advance scientific knowledge and social welfare.”126  As seen 
in Stenberg, the Court at one point afforded no deference to legislatures 
that improperly interfere with the medical community when findings are 
medically uncertain because the uncertainty is a factor that signifies “the 
presence of risk, not its absence.”127 
Regulations of medical providers’ speech implicates free speech.  
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations is 
central to First Amendment doctrine.128  Content-neutral regulations are 
 
 121. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 
(1973)). 
 122. Id. at 2316 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684). 
 123. Id. at 2318. 
 124. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“The safeguarding of these rights to the 
ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed 
through the processes of education and discussion is essential to free government . . . [and] to 
discover and spread political and economic truth.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 
(1964) (“For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.”). 
 125. Sarah Kramer, Not Your Mouthpiece: Abortion, Ideology, and Compelled Speech in 
Physician-Patient Relationships, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 9 (2018). 
 126. Id. at 10. 
 127. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000).  But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
164 (2007). 
 128. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996) (“The distinction between content-
based and content-neutral regulations of speech serves as the keystone of First Amendment law.”); 
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subject to intermediate scrutiny, under which a content-neutral regulation 
is constitutional “if it advances important governmental interests 
unrelated to suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially 
more speech than necessary to further those interests.”129  Content-based 
regulations––regulations that “target speech based on its communicative 
content”––are generally subject to strict scrutiny, under which they are 
“presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling 
state interests.”130  Content-based regulations present a risk that the 
government is attempting to “suppress unpopular ideas or information or 
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion,” as 
opposed to advancing legitimate regulatory goals.131 
Strict scrutiny, however, is not fatal in fact.132  At least two content-
based laws have survived strict scrutiny.133  One such case is Burson v. 
Freeman, in which the Court upheld a content-based restriction on 
soliciting votes and displaying campaign materials within 100 feet of 
polling place entrances, noting that this was “the rare case in which . . . a 
law survives strict scrutiny.”134  In finding that the State met strict 
scrutiny, the Court recognized “that the exercise of free speech rights 
conflicts with another fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot in an 
election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud.”135  In light of the 
conflict between these two rights, the Court held that “requiring 
solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling places does not 
constitute an unconstitutional compromise.”136 
Further, commercial speech is not subject to strict scrutiny.137  
 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 932 (5th ed. 2015) (“The 
Supreme Court frequently has declared that the very core of the First Amendment is that the 
government cannot regulate speech based on its content.”). 
 129. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–27 (2010) (quoting Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)). 
 130. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 395 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 115, 118 (1991)). 
 131. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
 132. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 846 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“First Amendment standards are rigorous. . . .  Those standards at their strictest make it 
difficult for the Government to prevail.  But they do not make it impossible for the Government to 
prevail.”). 
 133. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion); Holder, 561 U.S. at 
40. 
 134. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211 (plurality opinion). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines commercial speech as “[c]ommunication 
(such as advertising and marketing) that involves only the commercial 
interests of the speaker and the audience, and is therefore afforded lesser 
First Amendment protection.”138  Since the Court departed from the 
Lochner approach, “ordinary economic and social legislation,” including 
restrictions on commercial speech, “has been thought to raise little 
constitutional concern.”139   
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Court 
differentiated between circumstances where the government compels 
disclosure in commercial speech “and outright prohibitions” on 
commercial speech.140  Philip Zauderer, an attorney, was reprimanded by 
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio for his 
failure to include certain information in advertisements of his legal 
services.141  Zauderer’s newspaper advertisement was intended to attract 
clients injured by the use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.142  
The advertisement stated that “[i]f there is no recovery, no legal fees are 
owed by our clients,” but failed to note that clients may be liable for 
significant legal costs even if their lawsuit was unsuccessful, which 
violated an Ohio disciplinary rule requiring this disclosure.143  Zauderer 
argued that his First Amendment rights were violated by the government 
compelling this disclosure.144 
The Court determined that the required disclosure did not violate the 
First Amendment because the disclosure did not suppress commercial 
speech, but rather only required “somewhat more information” than what 
an advertiser would “otherwise be inclined to present.”145  The Court said 
that “disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an 
advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, warnings or 
 
prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”); 
see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1291 (2014) (“Under 
current free speech doctrine, compelled speech, which is a content-based regulation, is subject to 
strict scrutiny unless it is commercial.”). 
 138. Commercial Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 139. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 140. 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985).  Suppression of commercial speech are subject to review under 
the test outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980).  Id. at 638.  “Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not 
concern unlawful activities, however, may be restricted only in the service of a substantial 
governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.”  Id. 
 141. Id. at 630–33. 
 142. Id. at 630–31. 
 143. Id. at 631. 
 144. Id. at 634. 
 145. Id. at 650 
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disclaimers might be appropriately required in order to dissipate the 
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”146  The disciplinary rule 
only required Zauderer to include “purely factual and uncontroversial 
information about the terms under which his services will be 
available.”147  The Court held that disclosure requirements do not violate 
the First Amendment rights of an advertiser so long as the “disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.”148  Here, Ohio’s requirement that the 
advertisement disclose the possibility of legal costs was reasonably 
related to Ohio’s interest in protecting consumers from misleading 
advertisements.149 
This rationale was also at play in Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in 
Casey.150  Casey rejected the physician’s free speech argument, 
explaining: “To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to 
speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject 
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”151  The Court 
seemingly characterized the mandated disclosure as conduct a state may 
regulate “even though that conduct incidentally involves speech,” 
avoiding a more exacting standard of review.152 
However, the Supreme Court has held that commercial speech is 
limited to expression that “propose[s] a commercial transaction.”153  The 
doctor-patient relationship rises above a mere commercial transaction 
because “[p]hysician speech provides patients with expert information 
about medical conditions, procedures, risks, and appropriate courses of 
treatment.”154  Further, “a physician’s conversation with her client during 
the course of medical treatment is not an advertisement for a product or 
service, is not solely concerned with the sale of a product, and has little 
 
 146. Id. at 651. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 652. 
 150. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 977 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hen a state provides money to a 
private commercial enterprise, there is a legitimate public interest in informing taxpayers who the 
funds are benefiting and what services the funds are supporting.” (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 718 (3d Cir. 1991))). 
 151. Id. at 884 (citations omitted).   
 152. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (citing 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884). 
 153. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
 154. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First 
Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2367 (2013).   
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to do with the physician’s economic motivations.”155 
In Lowe v. SEC, Justice White noted in his concurring opinion that 
“the professional’s speech is incidental to the conduct of the 
profession.”156  Before NIFLA, some circuit courts invoked Justice 
White’s concurrence as articulating a “professional speech doctrine,”157 
which led to a circuit split over the recognition of “professional speech” 
as an independent category of speech subject to its own rules.158  The 
policy justification behind the professional speech doctrine as applied to 
the medical profession is centered on the special relationship established 
between medical providers and patients.159  The most important 
justification is that the health and safety of patients outweighs the 
benefits of political debate,160 making the marketplace of ideas theory a 
poor fit for regulation of physician speech.161  While recognized by some 
circuits, the professional speech doctrine was inconsistently applied and 
ultimately rejected in NIFLA. 
D. NIFLA v. Becerra 
In 2015, the California legislature passed the FACT Act to ensure 
that “[a]ll California women, regardless of income . . . have access to 
reproductive health services.”162  The California legislature enacted the 
FACT Act after it found “that a great number of California women were 
unaware of the existence of state-sponsored healthcare programs.”163  
The California legislature created the FACT Act to help low-income 
women find appropriate state-sponsored low-cost or free comprehensive  
 
 
 155. Id. at 2366. 
 156. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
 157. Keighley, supra note 154, at 2368.  See, e.g., Accountant’s Soc’y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 
F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1998) (arguing that Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe “provides sound, 
specific guidelines for determining” when “a measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a 
regulation of speech or of the press”). 
 158. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 
(2018) (describing the various approaches taken by the circuit courts).   
 159. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that, outside the 
physician-patient relationship, “doctors are constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and 
pamphleteers, and their speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment”). 
 160. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 951 (2007). 
 161. See id. at 973–74.  
 162. A.B. 775, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1(a) (Cal. 2015). 
 163. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d 
sub nom. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361.  
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family planning services.164  The legislature found that: 
Millions of California women are in need of publicly funded family 
planning services, contraception services and education, abortion 
services, and prenatal care and delivery.  In 2012, more than 2.6 million 
California women were in need of publicly funded family planning 
services.  More than 700,000 California women become pregnant every 
year and one-half of these pregnancies are unintended.  In 2010, 64.3 
percent of unplanned births in California were publicly funded.  Yet, at 
the moment they learn that they are pregnant, thousands of women 
remain unaware of the public programs available to provide them with 
contraception, health education and counseling, family planning, 
prenatal care, abortion, or delivery.165 
The FACT Act required licensed and unlicensed clinics to 
disseminate certain information to patients.166  The FACT Act defined 
licensed clinics to include licensed primary care or specialty clinics that 
have the “primary purpose” of “providing family planning or pregnancy-
related services.”167  The FACT Act further required licensed clinics to 
satisfy at least two of the following six requirements: 
(1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms, or 
prenatal care to pregnant women. 
(2) The facility provides, or offers counseling about, contraception or 
contraceptive methods. 
(3) The facility offers pregnancy testing or pregnancy diagnosis. 
(4) The facility advertises or solicits patrons with offers to provide 
prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests, or pregnancy options counseling. 
(5) The facility offers abortion services. 
(6) The facility has staff or volunteers who collect health information 
from clients.168 
The FACT Act defined unlicensed clinics as a facility that is not 
licensed by the state, without “a licensed medical provider on staff or 
under contract,” and that has the “‘primary purpose’ of ‘providing 
 
 164. Cal. A.B. 775. 
 165. Id. § 1(b). 
 166. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472 (West, Westlaw through ch. 3 of 2020 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 167. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368–69 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a)). 
 168. Id. (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a)). 
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pregnancy-related services.’”169  The facility must also meet at least two 
of the following requirements: 
(1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric sonograms, or 
prenatal care to pregnant women. 
(2) The facility offers pregnancy testing or pregnancy diagnosis. 
(3) The facility advertises or solicits patrons with offers to provide 
prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests, or pregnancy options counseling. 
(4) The facility has staff or volunteers who collect health information 
from clients.170 
Licensed facilities were required to provide the following notice: 
“California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost 
access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-
approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for 
eligible women.  To determine whether you qualify, contact the county 
social services office . . . .”171  Unlicensed clinics were required to 
provide the following notice: “This facility is not licensed as a medical 
facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical provider 
who provides or directly supervises the provision of services.”172  The 
FACT Act exempted from the notice requirement federal clinics and 
clinics that were enrolled in Medi-Cal and participated in the Family 
Planning, Access, Care, and Treatment Program.173 
In NIFLA v. Becerra, the National Institute of Family and Life 
Advocates, Pregnancy Care Center, and the Hope Clinic for Women 
(formerly the Fallbrook Pregnancy Resource Center) challenged the 
FACT Act on First Amendment grounds.174  Two of the three plaintiffs 
are nonprofit anti-abortion centers operating in California, while the 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates is a parent organization 
comprised of centers.175  The plaintiffs brought suit against the California 
Attorney General, alleging that the FACT Act violated their right to free 
 
 169. Id. at 2370 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(b)). 
 170. Id. (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(b)). 
 171. Id. at 2369 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1)). 
 172. Id. at 2370 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(b)(1)). 
 173. Id. at 2369 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(c)).  
 174. Id. at 2370.  
 175. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, No. 15cv2277, 2016 WL 3627327, at *1–
3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016). 
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speech and freedom of religion under the First Amendment.176  The 
plaintiffs argued the disclosure requirements of the FACT Act required 
them “to recite government messages promoting abortion and deterring 
women from speaking with them.”177  In light of these alleged potential 
violations, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin enforcement of the FACT Act until adjudication of the claims.178 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California denied the preliminary injunction,179 and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.180  The Ninth Circuit first explained that the Supreme Court did 
not establish a standard of review to apply when it upheld abortion-
related disclosure laws in Casey and Gonzales.181  The Ninth Circuit 
therefore turned to its own precedent recognizing a continuum of 
professional behavior, with “public dialogue” on one end, where the First 
Amendment is most protected, and “professional conduct” at the other 
end, where it is least protected.182  The Ninth Circuit held the FACT Act 
fell “in the middle of the continuum,” within the professional-client 
relationship where “the purpose . . . is to advance the welfare of the 
clients, rather than to contribute to public debate,” and intermediate 
scrutiny thus applied.183  It found that “the professional nature of the 
licensed clinics’ relationship with their clients extends beyond the 
examining room,” and the nonprofit status of the clinics did not change 
the fact that the clinics were “professional,” because the clinics had 
entered the marketplace as pregnancy clinics.184  The Ninth Circuit held 
that the licensed notice survived intermediate scrutiny because it 
advanced California’s substantial interest in ensuring California citizens 
have access to state-funded family-planning services and was narrowly 
drawn to inform pregnant women facing time-sensitive choices.185  The 
unlicensed notice survived any level of scrutiny, as the Ninth Circuit 
found the statute was narrowly tailored to advance California’s 
compelling interest in providing accurate information about the licensing 
 
 176. Id. at *2.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *1. 
 180. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d 
sub nom. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 181. Id. at 838.  
 182. Id. at 839 (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 183. Id. (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228). 
 184. Id. at 840.  
 185. Id. at 842.  
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status of clinics.186 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that both of the FACT Act’s 
notice requirements were unconstitutional infringements on the CPCs’ 
speech.187  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, found that the FACT 
Act was a content-based regulation of speech, and was thus 
presumptively unconstitutional––justified only if it survived strict 
scrutiny.188  The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s public speech 
continuum and declined to recognize “professional speech” as a separate 
category of speech meriting less First Amendment protection.189  Instead, 
the majority declared that only two exceptions exist to the general rule 
that “content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict 
scrutiny”190: (1) “laws that require professionals to disclose factual, 
noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’” under 
Zauderer191 and (2) laws that regulate “professional conduct” that 
“incidentally involves speech” under Casey.192 
The Court held that the licensed notice fell into neither exception.  
Distinguishing Zauderer, the Court found that the licensed notice 
required “these clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored 
services,” not services the clinic provides, “including abortion, anything 
but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”193  Casey also did not apply, said the 
Court, because the licensed notice was “not an informed-consent 
requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.”194  It was 
“not tied to a procedure at all” and “applie[d] to all interactions between 
a covered facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical 
procedure [wa]s ever sought, offered, or performed.”195  The licensed 
notice was therefore a regulation of “speech as speech” rather than of 
“professional conduct.”196  The Court held that when neither exception 
applied, content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.197 
The Court stated that even if there were reason to treat professional 
speech as a “unique category that is exempt from ordinary First 
 
 186. Id. at 843.  
 187. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018). 
 188. Id. at 2371. 
 189. Id. at 2371–72. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 2373. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 2373–74.  
 197. Id. at 2374. 
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Amendment principles,” the licensed notice would fail even intermediate 
scrutiny, as it was not “sufficiently drawn” to promote California’s 
interest in providing low-income women with information about the 
availability of state-sponsored services.198  The Court found the licensed 
notice “wildly underinclusive” because it applied only to federal clinics 
and clinics that were part of the state health care program.199  Further, 
California could have used a “public-information campaign” to inform 
women of their services.200 
The Court then held that the unlicensed notice would fail even if the 
Zauderer standard applied because California failed to show that the 
unlicensed notice was not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”201  In 
deciding the unlicensed notice was unjustified, Justice Thomas 
concluded that California’s only justification––“ensuring that pregnant 
women know when they are receiving medical care from licensed 
professionals”––was “purely hypothetical.”202  The Court also found the 
unlicensed notice underinclusive, and therefore unduly burdensome, 
because it applied only to facilities that provide pregnancy-related 
services, excluding facilities that that provide nonprescription 
contraceptives.203  The unlicensed notice was also unduly burdensome 
because it included requirements “to call attention to the notice . . . in as 
many as 13 different languages,” which would drown out the CPC’s own 
advertisements.204 
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan.  Criticizing the Court for recognizing only two narrow 
exceptions to the general rule that strict scrutiny applies to content-based 
regulations, the dissent argued that the Court’s approach threatens 
“virtually every disclosure law” in a way unseen since the Lochner era 
because “much, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through 
speech” and “much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of 
its content.”205  Justice Breyer stated that “[u]sing the First Amendment 
to strike down economic and social laws that legislatures long would 
 
 198. Id. at 2375. 
 199. Id. at 2375–76. 
 200. Id. at 2376. 
 201. Id. at 2377–78. 
 202. Id. at 2377. 
 203. Id. at 2378. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at 2380–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the laws that may be threatened, 
including, among others: securities laws, consumer protection laws, laws mandating hospitals to 
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have thought themselves free to enact will, for the American public, 
obscure, not clarify, the true value of protecting freedom of speech.”206  
This sentiment is echoed in Part III. 
Justice Breyer found Casey controlling.207  “If a State can lawfully 
require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption 
services,” he asked, “why should it not be able, as here, to require a 
medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other 
reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services?”208  
Justice Breyer rejected the majority’s distinction between the informed 
consent law at issue in Casey and the licensed notice as “lack[ing] moral, 
practical, and legal force.”209  He noted that the licensed clinics all 
included medical professionals providing pregnancy-related services and 
required such medical professionals to disclose information helpful to 
granting informed consent, and thus similarly regulated professional 
conduct of the practice of medicine.210 
Further, Justice Breyer cited Zauderer for the proposition that 
heightened scrutiny is inapplicable to the licensed notice, arguing the 
question instead should be “whether the disclosure requirements were 
‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers’” because the information “is related to the services that 
licensed clinics provide.”211  He explained that the licensed disclosure 
would not warrant heightened scrutiny in this instance because it requires 
the disclosure of purely factual information regarding state resources.212  
As for the unlicensed disclosure, Justice Breyer noted the majority’s 
approach was also “incompatible with Zauderer” because the standard is 
not whether the “State’s interest is purely hypothetical”––a standard 
applicable to speech restrictions, not disclosures––rather, the standard is 
whether the disclosure requirement is “reasonably related to the State’s 
interest.”213  Even so, he said, “[t]here is no basis for finding the State’s 
interest hypothetical,” noting that the California legislature “heard that 
information-related delays in qualified healthcare negatively affect 
 
 206. Id. at 2383. 
 207. Id. at 2385 (noting that Casey upheld a “requirement that the doctor must inform his patient 
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women seeking to terminate their pregnancies as well as women carrying 
their pregnancies to term, with delays in qualified prenatal care causing 
life-long health problems for infants.”214  Finally, legislatures can 
counteract these impacts “by a general rule, even though in particular 
instances there might be no actual deception or misstatement.”215 
III. ANALYSIS 
It is necessary to examine the NIFLA majority’s reasoning and 
synthesize the rule it set forth because there is a double standard at play.  
On remand, the Ninth Circuit must now review the case under strict 
scrutiny, and while strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal in fact, this Part 
argues that the FACT Act fails strict scrutiny.  This Part also argues that 
NIFLA finally gives physicians a leg to stand on to invalidate state-
mandated compelled speech informed consent disclosures in the abortion 
context.  First, this Part analyzes NIFLA’s holding and argues that the 
FACT Act is not narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny.  Next, it 
discusses NIFLA’s power to invalidate paternalistic informed consent 
laws regulating abortion, and then applies the NIFLA standard to Kansas, 
South Dakota, and Indiana abortion informed consent statutes, which 
provide clear examples of unconstitutional abortion regulations under the 
guise of informed consent.  Lastly, this Part concludes by redrafting a 
section of the FACT Act that would likely fit within the exception 
recognized by the majority that allows for the regulation of professional 
conduct that incidentally involves speech.  
A. NIFLA Allows CPCs to Play Doctor 
NIFLA is problematic because it gives CPCs a green light to offer 
medical advice free of state regulation.  The Court in NIFLA held that the 
CPCs were likely to succeed on the merits,216 signaling the lower court to 
issue a preliminary injunction.  NIFLA potentially signifies the end of a 
commercial speech exception to strict scrutiny review under the First 
Amendment.217  But, perhaps the upside of NIFLA is that it may lead to 
the end of paternalistic informed consent statutes in the context of 
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abortion.  Under the standard set forth in NIFLA, many, if not all, 
abortion informed consent laws are unconstitutional. 
The Court applied a standard that is inconsistent with free speech and 
informed consent case law.218  By providing only two narrow exceptions 
to the general rule that content-based regulations are subject to strict 
scrutiny analysis, NIFLA departed from Supreme Court precedent.  This 
has left a need for the adoption of a rule that not remains faithful to 
Supreme Court precedent and protects women seeking an abortion.219  As 
the dissent in NIFLA emphasized, stare decisis requires consistency 
between the Court’s precedent and NIFLA.220 
Possible reasons for the distinction between Casey and NIFLA could 
be the subject of the disclosures, the types of services provided, or the 
fact that CPCs and abortion clinics employ different medical providers.  
The distinction, however, cannot be because of the subject of the 
disclosure.  The contested disclosures in NIFLA “concern[ed] speech 
related to abortion.”221  The Court in Casey similarly assessed the 
constitutionality of disclosure requirements related to reproductive 
health.222  However, the Court has never heard a case on the 
constitutionality of informed consent requirements outside the context of 
contraception and abortion.  As Justice Breyer argued in his NIFLA 
dissent, Casey should have controlled because “there is no convincing 
reason to distinguish between information about adoption and 
information about abortion in this context.”223 
One could logically conclude the dissenters are right: there is no 
reason to treat the FACT Act differently than other informed consent 
statutes, and therefore Casey should control.  Another rational conclusion 
is that CPCs should receive different treatment than other medical 
providers.  Despite the claims presented on their websites224 and the 
occasional presence of licensed medical professionals on staff,225 perhaps 
 
 218. Compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–83 (1992) (upholding 
a law requiring medical providers to provide anti-abortion information to women seeking abortions), 
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 219. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2381–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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 223. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 224. See, e.g., About NIFLA, supra note 66 (advertising “medical” services); see also Our 
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 225. Bryant, supra note 33.  
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CPCs are not medical providers at all, but proselytizing anti-abortion 
activists dressed in doctors’ clothing.  From this perspective, the FACT 
Act does not provide informed consent disclosure requirements.  
The lack of discovery allowed the justices to ignore that the CPC 
petitioners are engaged in medical procedures, screenings, methods of 
treatment, counseling, or any other medical intervention.226  Because 
NIFLA dealt with a preliminary injunction,227 discovery had not yet 
occurred, and there is no way to tell if the majority’s reasoning would 
have differed in light of the likelihood that the CPCs are practicing 
medicine.  However, it is possible to examine the general practices of the 
CPC petitioners to predict what standard would have applied to the 
speech regulating professional conduct on the facts of the case in light of 
Supreme Court precedent. 
On remand, the petitioners’ arguments could fail in the Ninth Circuit 
because their constitutional concerns could be overcome by controlling 
Supreme Court precedent that may be invoked after discovery if 
discovery leads to the conclusion that the medical providers in licensed 
CPCs are engaged in the professional conduct or commercial speech.  In 
NIFLA, the petitioners argued that their speech was not commercial 
because: (1) they are nonprofits; (2) their services are free; and (3) other 
courts have found that CPCs are not commercial in nature and therefore 
not subject to commercial speech regulations.228  A profit motive alone, 
however, is not dispositive of whether speech is commercial speech.229  
The “content and context”230 of commercial speech “does no more than 
propose a commercial transaction,”231 and courts must examine “the 
 
 226. Justice Kennedy refused to look online at the CPCs’ websites to discover the services they 
purport to provide because that information was beyond the record.  See Transcript of Oral 
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nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled 
statement thereon.”232 
Since the Lochner era, the Court has given deference to state 
regulations of the medical profession.233  States may impose reasonable 
conditions on the practice of medical and “[m]edical professionals do 
not, generally speaking, have a right to use the Constitution as a weapon 
allowing them rigorously to control the content of those reasonable 
conditions.”234  As the Court explained in its 1926 Lambert v. Yellowley 
decision, “there is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate 
to the police power of the states.”235  Lambert utilized only a rational 
basis standard of review,236 which the FACT Act would pass because not 
only does California have a legitimate interest in promoting the health of 
women, it arguably has a compelling one, much like Pennsylvania did in 
Casey.237 
It is true, however, that the doctor-patient relationship is not truly 
commercial in nature.238  Medical providers engage in commercial 
speech when placing an advertisement in a local newspaper or running a 
television commercial for a cancer treatment center,239 but when speech 
takes place in a clinical setting, like in a discussion to obtain informed 
consent or a disclosure of the alternative services offered by the state, the 
communication transcends commercial speech.240  NIFLA, however, 
ignored the context of the FACT Act disclosures.  CPCs often present 
themselves as medical clinics, and their medical providers, or persons 
playing doctor, purport to advise women of their medical options.  This 
makes the holding troubling, particularly given that the Court upheld the 
 
 232. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
 233. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  But see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 
U.S. 552, 567, 580 (2011) (holding that a Vermont law restricting the use of pharmacy records for 
marketing purposes “imposes more than an incidental burden on protected expression” because it “is 
directed at certain content and is aimed at particular speakers”). 
 234. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 235. 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926). 
 236. Id. at 589, 594–95. 
 237. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884–86 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 238. See Keighley, supra note 154, at 2365 (arguing that doctor-patient speech “does not 
qualify” as commercial speech).  But see Corbin, supra note 137, at 1286 (considering Zauderer’s 
holding to be general enough to apply to physicians and nonprofits and stating that, “[c]learly, the 
commercial-noncommercial dichotomy overlooks speech that falls in between, including speech by 
individual professionals and advertising by nonprofit entities”).  
 239. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1985) (examining 
the commercial nature of an advertisement in the context of legal services). 
 240. Keighley, supra note 154, at 2366 (“[A] physician’s speech during the provision of medical 
care falls outside of this definition [of commercial speech].”). 
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inverse of the required disclosures as a constitutional informed consent 
law in Casey.241  The Court argued that the contrasting holdings in Casey 
and NIFLA resulted from the different standards of review the facts 
necessitated.  In Casey, the Court analyzed the physician’s speech under 
the rational basis test.242  In contrast to the strict scrutiny standard of 
review applied in NIFLA, the rational basis hurdle is inherently easier for 
states to overcome when all they need to assert is that the content-based 
regulation of speech on physicians offering abortion procedures is 
reasonably designed to promote the state’s interest in preserving 
potential life. 
The lack of discovery in NIFLA243 allowed the majority to ignore that 
CPCs are engaged in medical procedures, screenings, methods of 
treatment, counseling, or any other medical intervention.244  These facts, 
however, are likely to be found as the litigation proceeds.  CPCs are 
likely engaged in the practice of medicine, especially those operating as 
licensed clinics.245  National Institute of Family and Life Advocates 
asserts on its own website that their CPCs are medical clinics.246  Hope 
Clinic for Women, the unlicensed CPC petitioner in NIFLA, lists medical 
services the clinic provides, which include: (1) verifying pregnancy; (2) 
determining the gestational age of the fetus; and (3) providing “facts 
about abortion and the documented abortion risk factors.”247  The CPC, 
however, admits on its own website that pregnancy can only be 
diagnosed by a licensed physician.248  Pregnancy Care Center (doing 
business as Pregnancy Care Clinic), a licensed health care facility, also 
(1) verifies pregnancy; (2) conducts ultrasound exams; (3) offers health 
 
 241. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2386–87 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 242. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884, 880 (plurality opinion). 
 243. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2370.  
 244. Justice Kennedy refused to look online at the CPCs’ websites to discover the services they 
purport to provide because that information was beyond the record.  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 22, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140).  
 245. See About NIFLA, supra note 66 (“NIFLA now represents more than 1,500 pro-life 
pregnancy centers across the country.  Of that number, over 1,200 operate as licensed medical 
clinics. . . .  NIFLA has two key programs to support compliance and conversion for pregnancy 
centers.  The Life Choice Project (TLC) offers a step-by-step conversion program, while NIFLA’s 
Institute in Limited Obstetric Ultrasound equips medical and management personnel in the legal 
requirements for operating a medical clinic.”). 
 246. See id.  
 247. Our Services, supra note 224. 
 248. Id.  The Hope Clinic for Women carefully disclaims “only a licensed physician can 
diagnose pregnancy,” and explains that “[i]f you have a positive pregnancy test our staff may 
schedule a limited OB ultrasound appointment for you with the mobile medical clinic that comes to 
HCW on a regular basis.”  Id.  “The staff at HCW will help you understand your options.”  Id.  
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provider consultations; (4) makes medical referrals; and (5) offers 
consultations regarding family planning and sexually transmitted 
diseases.249  By offering the same services as medical providers, CPCs as 
licensed and unlicensed facilities walk right up to the line and 
intentionally blur what constitutes medical care. 
Assuming that the two compelled disclosures in Casey and NIFLA 
are virtually indistinguishable, it is unnecessary to examine the licensed 
and unlicensed disclosures separately.  The analysis of each disclosure is 
not distinct because the focus to determine if the center is engaged in the 
practice of medicine is what the CPCs are doing and saying—or not 
doing and not saying—which does not change drastically between the 
CPCs with medical licenses and those without.250  Examining “the nature 
of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled 
statement,”251 it is evident that CPCs are either likely engaging in the 
practice of medicine or acting as if they are engaged in the practice of 
medicine.252 
Because CPCs either do practice or appear to practice medicine, the 
Ninth Circuit should apply the commercial speech exception to strict 
scrutiny recognized in NIFLA on remand.  Supreme Court precedent 
since the Lochner era, which consistently gives deference to state 
regulations of medical practice,253 should apply to the regulation of CPCs 
as well.  The conclusion that CPCs practice medicine, which was 
arguably unavailable to the Supreme Court without discovery, may be 
available to the Ninth Circuit.254  However, the Ninth Circuit will likely 
apply strict scrutiny in light of the NIFLA majority’s determination that 
the petitioners were likely to succeed on the merits and that it was not 
persuaded an exception to strict scrutiny analysis applied.255 
 
 249. Services, PREGNANCY CARE CLINIC, https://www.unplannedparenthood.org/services/ 
[https://perma.cc/ACY6-3EUM] (last visited May 11, 2020). 
 250. See Alice X. Chen, Note, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the Right to Informed 
Decision Making, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933, 935–36 (2013) (listing the practices of licensed 
and unlicensed CPCs). 
 251. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
 252. See Chen, supra note 250, at 948–49. 
 253. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1955) (upholding 
state statute regulating opticians).   
 254. Justice Sotomayor went beyond the record and looked at the websites of the petitioners 
before concluding that they were engaged in the practice of medicine, and Justice Kennedy 
mentioned the inability of the justices to conduct outside discovery.  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 18–22, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 
16-1140). 
 255. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (recognizing that the notice would not “survive even 
intermediate scrutiny”). 
862 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
B. The FACT Act Fails Strict Scrutiny Because It Is Not Narrowly 
Tailored 
The NIFLA battle is not over.  Even if strict scrutiny applies, the 
FACT Act may survive, despite the Court’s ruling that the petitioners 
were likely to succeed on the merits.256  The FACT Act will survive strict 
scrutiny if California can show (1) that the government’s interest is 
compelling and (2) that the statute is narrowly tailored as the least 
restrictive means to accomplish the state’s regulatory goal.257  Surviving 
strict scrutiny is rare, however, and unlikely here, given the Supreme 
Court’s decision. 
California has a compelling interest at stake.  The state, in enacting 
the FACT Act, sought to remove obstacles in the path of a woman 
seeking reproductive health care.258  But the FACT Act should fail strict 
scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve California’s 
regulatory goals.  There are alternatives California may impose that 
would be less burdensome to the speaker,259 such as promulgating a 
truth-in-advertising statute that applies to medical clinics and then 
prosecuting those who engage in misleading or false advertising 
practices.260  Another alternative is to provide the information to low-
income women through advertising campaigns that offer free pregnancy 
diagnoses by licensed physicians participating in Medi-Cal with the 
intent to identify eligible women to enroll in the state’s program.  In 
 
 256. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (noting that a case rarely survives 
strict scrutiny, but the two conflicting fundamental rights at issue made the survival of strict scrutiny 
possible); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27–28, 40 (2010) (finding a federal 
statute survived strict scrutiny analysis). 
 257. Burson, 504 U.S. at 198. 
 258. This argument does not appear in the briefs filed by the respondents, however amicus briefs 
for the respondents have detailed this argument and other compelling interests that would allow the 
Reproductive FACT Act to pass strict scrutiny.  One amicus brief for the respondents argued that 
California has a “compelling interest in ensuring women have access to comprehensive and timely 
healthcare information and services in the face of deception.”  Brief for Reproductive Rights, Civil 
Rights, and Social Justice Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, NIFLA, 138 
S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140), 2018 WL 1168249.  Another amicus brief for the respondents argued that 
California has a compelling interest in mitigating the prima facie unethical medical conduct of the 
Pregnancy Care Clinic and that the Reproductive FACT Act survives strict scrutiny based on this 
compelling state interest.  See Brief of American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 14, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140), 2018 WL 1156609. 
 259. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (discussing the “disconnect between [the FACT Act’s] stated 
purpose and its actual scope” and suggesting less burdensome alternatives such as a public-
information campaign or posting information on public property near CPCs).  
 260. This may be problematic as applied to unlicensed CPCs, however, as there is debate 
surrounding whether these centers are medical clinics and if the centers’ speech is commercial.  See 
Campbell, supra note 34, at 99–100.  
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conclusion, while California’s interest is compelling, it is likely not 
narrowly tailored, and therefore will likely fail strict scrutiny,261 
especially if the Ninth Circuit relies on Justice Thomas’s reasoning in 
NIFLA. 
C. NIFLA’s Power to Invalidate Current “Informed Consent” Abortion 
Laws 
Exempting paternalistic abortion-specific informed consent laws that 
have no basis in science or medicine from strict scrutiny analysis but 
subjecting state laws that regulate misleading and deceptive CPC 
practices through mandatory disclosure requirements to strict scrutiny is 
unjust and leaves many women uninformed of their options.  To suggest 
that the voice of one set of medical providers is more important than 
another’s establishes that only one view is suitable, which is exactly the 
type of bias the First Amendment is supposed to protect against.262  In a 
world where states continue to restrict access to abortion,263 CPCs should 
not be able to hide behind the First Amendment for protection while 
playing doctor with marginalized women264 who are in need of accurate 
medical information and medical care free of moral judgment. 
The purposes of laws like the FACT Act are to protect marginalized 
women from being taken advantage of,265 persuaded to leave their due 
 
 261. The Ninth Circuit, however, determined the disclosure was narrowly tailored and the FACT 
Act survived any standard of review.  See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 
823, 829 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The licensed notice regulates professional speech, subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, which it survives.  The unlicensed notice survives any level of review.”), rev’d sub 
nom. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 262. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If a State can lawfully require a 
doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services,” as in Casey, “why should it not 
be able, as here, to require a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other 
reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services?”).   
 263. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state 
-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/EJQ6-RLRM] (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) 
(stating that “45 states allow individual health care providers to refuse to participate in an abortion,” 
“42 states allow institutions to refuse to perform abortions,” and “43 states prohibit abortions, 
generally except when necessary to protect the woman’s life or health, after a specified point in 
pregnancy”).  Despite these restrictions, about one fourth of American women will have had an 
abortion by the time they have reached forty-five.  See Abortion Is a Common Experience for U.S. 
Women, Despite Dramatic Declines in Rates, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 19, 2017), https:// 
www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2017/abortion-common-experience-us-women-despite-dramatic-
declines-rates [https://perma.cc/K29U-EGQK]. 
 264. Campbell, supra note 34, at 76 (“CPCs specifically target low-income communities, 
minority populations, and places with young, vulnerable women, like high schools and colleges.  
CPCs believe their efforts are best suited for these demographics because they have higher rates of 
pregnancy and abortion, and thus, are more susceptible to CPC practices.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 265. Chen, supra note 250, at 944 (“The purposes of these ordinances are to protect public 
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process rights behind, and forced to face the real life medical 
consequences of pregnancy, labor, and delivery without fully 
understanding their rights or the medical risks and benefits of all 
options.266  The goal of providing women with information is similar to 
the stated purpose of the law at issue in Casey, which also had the 
purpose of informing women.267 
Justice Breyer’s NIFLA dissent highlighted the similarities between 
the FACT Act and the law at issue in Casey, and argued that Casey 
should have applied.268  The missing piece in the dissent’s analysis is that 
the FACT Act’s notice requirements and the abortion-specific informed 
consent laws are not actually informed consent requirements.  The 
informed consent process requires that medical providers use their 
professional judgment to inform patients about the risks and benefits 
associated with a medical treatment.269  The information required for 
informed consent cannot be packaged in a script determined by the 
government. 
In certain informed consent laws, state ideological speech 
masquerades as medically necessary information.  This is 
unconstitutional.  In Casey, Planned Parenthood unsuccessfully argued 
that a Pennsylvania informed consent law violated the First 
Amendment.270  The Court rejected this argument in three sentences: 
 All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First 
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the 
risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State.  
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are 
implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to 
 
health, to prevent false advertising, and to encourage pregnant women to consult medically licensed 
health professionals.”). 
 266. “The stated purpose of the FACT Act . . .  is to ensure that California residents make their 
personal reproductive health care decisions knowing their rights and the health care services 
available to them.”  NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369.  For example, one pregnant woman sought prenatal 
care at a CPC and began displaying abnormal symptoms in her pregnancy.  Molly Redden, One State 
Finally Cracked Down on Crisis Pregnancy Centers, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 12, 2015), http:// 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/10/state-just-became-first-crack-down-deceptive-anti-abortion-
pregnancy-centers [https://perma.cc/55WW-RZ78].  The woman had diabetes, but the CPC provided 
no treatment to lower her abnormally high blood sugar levels.  Id.  Dr. Sally Greenwald, an OB-
GYN who later cared for the woman, explained that because the CPC failed to address her diabetes, 
“[t]he fetus was exposed to lifelong risks, such as cardiac malformations, brain abnormalities, and 
spine deformations.”  Id. 
 267. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 268. See id. at 2383–85. 
 269. See Informed Consent, AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 45 
 270. See Reply Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 20–22, Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 551420. 
2020] PLAYING DOCTOR 865 
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.  We see no 
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide 
the information mandated by the State here.271 
Contrast this with NIFLA, which held that “[s]peech is not unprotected 
merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals,’”272 and recognized only 
two exceptions to the general rule that content-based regulations are 
subject strict scrutiny analysis: (1) laws that require the disclosure of 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which . . . services will be available”;273 and (2) laws that regulate 
“professional conduct” that “incidentally involves speech.”274  The 
comparison of Casey and NIFLA brings to light the double standard at 
play.  The Supreme Court cannot allow informed consent laws like those 
at issue in Casey to stand and at the same time strike down the FACT 
Act in NIFLA.  Alternatively, if the Court is right in finding that strict 
scrutiny should apply to the FACT Act, abortion informed consent laws 
must also be invalidated on free speech grounds.  The Court cannot 
choose to apply an inconsistent standard that favors one set of speakers. 
Applying the standard set forth in NIFLA to abortion informed 
consent laws in effect in Kansas, South Dakota, Indiana, and other states 
with similar statutes, demonstrates these informed consent laws burden 
the speaker’s First Amendment rights.  Under NIFLA, all content-based 
regulations burden free speech and are “presumptively 
unconstitutional.”275 
1. The Kansas Abortion Informed Consent Law Is Unconstitutional 
The Kansas abortion-specific informed consent law is a content-
based regulation, and thus is presumptively unconstitutional and subject 
to strict scrutiny under NIFLA.  In Kansas, a woman seeking an abortion 
provides informed consent to the procedure only if she receives a lengthy 
list of required disclosures.276  These required disclosures include, among 
others: (1) “a description of the proposed abortion method”; (2) “a 
 
 271. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). 
 272. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. 
 273. Id. at 2372 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 274. Id.  
 275. Id. at 2371 (noting that content-based regulations “target speech based on its 
communicative content” and “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” (quoting Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015))). 
 276. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (West 2018). 
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description of risks related to the proposed abortion method, including 
risk of premature birth in future pregnancies, risk of breast cancer,” as 
well as “risks to the woman’s reproductive health and alternatives to the 
abortion that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision 
of whether or not to undergo the abortion”; (3) “the probable gestational 
age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to be performed”; and 
(4) “the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
unborn child at the time the abortion is to be performed.”277  The woman 
must also be informed that: 
(1) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, 
childbirth and neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the 
availability of such assistance is contained in the printed materials 
given to her and described in K.S.A. 65-6710, and amendments thereto;  
(2) the informational materials in K.S.A. 65-6710, and amendments 
thereto, are available in printed form and online, and describe the 
unborn child, list agencies which offer alternatives to abortion with a 
special section listing adoption services and list providers of free 
ultrasound services;  
(3) the father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her 
child, even in instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion 
except that in the case of rape this information may be omitted; 
(4) the woman is free to withhold or withdraw her consent to the 
abortion at any time prior to invasion of the uterus without affecting her 
right to future care or treatment and without the loss of any state or 
federally-funded benefits to which she might otherwise be entitled; 
(5) the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, 
living human being; and 
(6) by no later than 20 weeks from fertilization, the unborn child has 
the physical structures necessary to experience pain.  There is evidence 
that by 20 weeks from fertilization unborn children seek to evade 
certain stimuli in a manner that in an infant or an adult would be 
interpreted to be a response to pain.  Anesthesia is routinely 
administered to unborn children who are 20 weeks from fertilization or 
older who undergo prenatal surgery.278 
The Kansas statute is a content-based regulation of speech because it 
compels physicians to speak a particular message.279  There is no 
 
 277. Id. at § 65-6709(a)(2)–(5). 
 278. Id. § 65-6709(b). 
 279. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. 
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“professional speech” exception that may apply.280  Further, neither 
exception recognized in NIFLA applies.  First, “laws that require 
professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their 
‘commercial speech’” are not subject to strict scrutiny.281  Most of the 
Kansas statute’s disclosure requirements, however, are not factual.  It is 
well established that there is no relationship between abortion and breast 
cancer.282  The most common type of abortion procedure poses no 
increased risk of infertility or sterility for women later in life and the less 
common abortion procedures pose only a two percent chance of 
sterility.283  Abortion is usually a safe procedure284 and does not pose an 
increased risk of complications in future pregnancies.285 
Even if these disclosures were factual, abortion is, as Justice Thomas 
himself put it, “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”286  Most of the 
disclosure requirements in Kansas are extremely controversial and based 
on the state’s ideological view that abortion is immoral.  The required 
disclosure that the fetus at twenty weeks “has the physical structures 
necessary to experience pain,”287 as well as the disclosure of the 
gestational age and anatomic features of the fetus,288 are included to 
 
 280. See id. at 2371–72 (“Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by 
‘professionals.’”).  But see id. at 2375 (“[N]either California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a 
persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary 
First Amendment principles.  We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists.”). 
 281. Id. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). 
 282. See Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk: 2003 Workshop, NAT’L CANCER INST. 
(Jan. 12, 2010), https://www.cancer.gov/types/breast/abortion-miscarriage-risk [https://perma.cc 
/QY24-YRCN] (providing a review of studies concluding abortion and miscarriage are “not 
associated with an increase in breast cancer risk”); MINORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T 
REFORM, 109TH CONG., FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY 
FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS 7–9 (2006) [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT] (“There is a 
medical consensus that there is no causal relationship between abortion and breast cancer.”).  
 283. Hani K. Atrash & Carol J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect of Pregnancy Termination on Future 
Reproduction, 4 BAILLIÈRE’S CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 391, 391–405 (1990); see 
also F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 877 (21st ed. 2001) (“Fertility is not 
altered by an elective abortion.”).  
 284. David A. Grimes, Estimation of Pregnancy-Related Mortality Risk by Pregnancy Outcome, 
United States, 1991 to 1999, 194 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 92 (2006) (stating that 
abortion has the lowest risk of pregnancy-related maternal death of all pregnancy outcomes studied). 
 285. See Yvonne Butler Tobah, Could an Abortion Increase the Risk of Problems in a 
Subsequent Pregnancy?, MAYO CLINIC (July 19, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy 
-lifestyle/getting-pregnant/expert-answers/abortion/faq-20058551 [https://perma.cc/WT5B-7WYH] 
(“Generally, elective abortion isn’t thought to cause fertility issues or complications in future 
pregnancies.”). 
 286. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 287. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(6) (West 2018). 
 288. Id. § 65-6709(a)(4)–(5). 
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insinuate the “unborn child” may be experiencing pain.289  Further, the 
fetal pain disclosure requirement is not supported by the available 
evidence.290  In 2005, a multidisciplinary review published in the Journal 
of the American Medical Association found that the gestational brain 
developments necessary for a fetus to experience pain do not occur until 
the third trimester, concluding: “Pain is an emotional and psychological 
experience that requires conscious recognition of a noxious stimulus.  
Consequently, the capacity for conscious perception of pain can arise 
only after thalamocortical pathways begin to function, which may occur 
in the third trimester around 29 to 30 weeks’ gestational age.”291 
The required disclosures on available resources and child support 
may also be false, misleading, or unrelated to the services offered by the 
abortion provider.  The availability of a child support obligation depends 
on unique circumstances of the parents and needs of the child, as “[e]ach 
case is different.”292  Further, the required disclosure about the potential 
availability of other state-sponsored resources like Kan-Care “in no way 
relates to the services the licensed clinics provide,” but rather “state-
sponsored services.”293  Lastly, the required disclosure that abortion will 
“terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being”294 is 
controversial because it requires physicians to speak the state’s 
ideological viewpoint on an unsettled medical, philosophical, and 
theological issue: whether the fetus is a human being.295  A state may not 
impose speech on a physician regarding this controversial topic when 
“the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the 
 
 289. See Tobin, supra note 57, at 144–45 (“The reasonable lay reader would be likely to infer 
that when ‘the necessary structures’ are in place, pain perception can occur. . . .  [But] it appears that 
[the neural structures necessary for pain perception] are not meaningfully functional until the start of 
the third trimester, about twenty-nine to thirty weeks' gestational age.”). 
 290. Lindsay J. Calhoun, The Painless Truth: Challenging Fetal Pain-Based Abortion Bans, 87 
TUL. L. REV. 141, 163–64 (2012) (quoting Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic 
Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 952 (2005)). 
 291. Lee et al., supra note 290.  
 292. LINDA D. ELROD, 2 KAN. LAW & PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 14:16, Westlaw (database updated 
Dec. 2019).  But see Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 533–34 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“The provision discussing medical assistance provides that the required benefits ‘may be available,’ 
not that they are available.  The statement that the father is liable to assist in supporting the child 
finds its support in other North Dakota statutes.  If in certain cases such a statement would be 
misleading or false, it would undoubtedly be because of unique and personal background facts that 
would be at least suspected if not known to the woman.” (citations omitted)). 
 293. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). 
 294. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5) (West 2018). 
 295. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (“We need not resolve the difficult question of 
when life begins.  When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of 
man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”). 
2020] PLAYING DOCTOR 869 
whole sense.”296 
The second exception set forth in NIFLA also is inapplicable because 
these mandatory disclosures are not regulating professional conduct that 
incidentally burdens speech.  The Kansas statute’s required disclosures 
are not informed consent requirements.  The Kansas statute requires 
disclosures about unrealistic risks, available resources, and child support 
to all women seeking abortion, regardless of whether the information 
will be of no use, such as to women who are married, women who are 
already fully appraised of their options because they have had the 
procedure before, and women who have concluded that abortion is the 
only reasonable option.297  Finally, the disclosure requirements related to 
the termination of the fetus and the probable gestational age are not 
informed consent requirements because this information is irrelevant to a 
woman’s choice on whether or not to obtain an abortion.298  The 
information required for informed consent is centered on professional 
judgment calls,299 and while some of the required disclosures discussed 
above are based in fact, the disclosure does not serve a practical purpose.  
Because the Kansas informed consent disclosure requirements are not 
informed consent requirements, they “regulate[] speech as speech” and 
the exception does not apply.300 
Because the NIFLA exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny to 
content-based regulations of speech would not apply, the Kansas statute 
would be analyzed under strict scrutiny, which it would fail.  The Kansas 
statute will survive strict scrutiny only if Kansas could demonstrate that: 
(1) the governmental interest is compelling; and (2) that the statute is 
narrowly tailored as the least restrictive means to accomplish the 
regulatory goal.301  The governmental interest is compelling,302 but the 
statute is not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest.303  Just 
like California’s regulatory goals could be met by less burdensome 
means in NIFLA, Kansas’s regulatory goals could also be met by less 
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burdensome means like providing the information in advertising 
campaigns or posting information on public property near an abortion 
clinic.304  “The First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice 
speech for efficiency.”305  Because less burdensome means are available, 
the statute likely fails strict scrutiny. 
2. Other State Informed Consent Laws Incorrectly Stating Risks of 
Abortion Are  Also Unconstitutional 
South Dakota’s abortion-specific informed consent statute is 
similarly unconstitutional.  Like the Kansas statute, it requires disclosure 
that the abortion terminates “the life of a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being.”306  Further, it requires a statement that the patient “has an 
existing relationship with that unborn human being.”307  The statute also 
contains a required disclosure related to the “risks” of abortion, including 
an increased risk of suicide and infertility.308  Both of these “risks” are 
unsupported by medical evidence.309  Lastly, having an abortion does not 
put a woman at risk of significant psychological harm.310  In fact, the 
scientific evidence shows that women who carry to term experience need 
for psychological treatment at the same rate as women who have had an 
abortion.311 
Indiana’s abortion-specific informed consent requirement is 
unconstitutional as well.  The physician is required to inform the woman 
of the risks to the “potential danger of infertility,” “danger to subsequent 
pregnancy,” “[t]hat human physical life begins when a human ovum is 
fertilized by a human sperm,” and that an ultrasound image and 
“auscultation of fetal heart tone[s]” are available.312  There are likely 
many other states that restrict abortion in similar ways to Kansas, South 
Dakota, and Indiana because the vast majority of states restrict access to 
abortion in some way.313  Such restrictions would necessarily burden the 
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physician’s First Amendment rights under NIFLA. 
These government-scripted disclosures while serving a compelling 
interest, are not narrowly tailored.  Just like Kansas, South Dakota and 
Indiana could publish information on abortion or alternatives to abortion, 
including state resources, on a government website or in advertisements.  
The manipulation of informed consent into a government mandated 
script transforms the physician into a mouthpiece of the government to 
espouse ideological views about the life of the fetus or to disclose “risks” 
that are not tied to the procedure at all, and there are less burdensome 
ways the state could inform women of this view without impacting the 
speech of the physician. 
Many, if not all, state abortion disclosure requirements could be 
found unconstitutional based on the holding in NIFLA that all content-
based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny unless two narrow 
exceptions apply.  These laws do not “facilitate informed consent to a 
medical procedure,”314 as the required scripts physicians must read do 
not provide medically necessary “information about the risks or benefits” 
of abortion.315  Rather, states are purportedly using their “regulatory 
authority to show [their claim of] profound respect for the life within the 
woman,” when there are less burdensome means to do so.316 
For example, many states require physicians to inform women about 
adoption and the right to seek child support from the father.317  This 
information has nothing to do with the medical procedure, indicating that 
the laws are not narrowly tailored.  The alternative to abortion is carrying 
a child to term, not carrying a child to term and giving up parental rights 
or initiating an action to establish child support.  Tellingly, the only 
difference between these required disclosures and the FACT Act’s notice 
requirements is ideological viewpoint.  The First Amendment applies 
equally to medical providers advocating anti-abortion beliefs and to 
those who are pro-choice.  Thus, NIFLA has paved the way for 
physicians to successfully challenge these state informed consent laws as 
a violation of their First Amendment rights. 
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D. Protecting the First Amendment and Preserving Medical Ethics After 
NIFLA 
The FACT Act tried to accomplish too much and was too broad to 
regulate CPCs.  Some predicted that the FACT Act was the answer to 
regulating CPCs and served as a model for how other states may frame 
their own laws to protect their most marginalized women.318  The 
ultimate answer is that informed consent laws are subject to strict 
scrutiny analysis and must be unconstitutional when they are not based in 
fact or sufficiently tailored to the offered medical procedures. 
To cure the problem with the FACT Act, California could pass new 
legislation that meets the exception for the regulation of professional 
conduct recognized in NIFLA.  A new act could incorporate the FACT 
Act definitions of licensed and unlicensed clinics and keep the notice 
requirements.319  A content-based regulation of professional conduct, 
however, must tie the medical counseling services to the required notices 
to satisfy the standard set forth in NIFLA.  This may be done by revising 
the language in section 123472 as follows: 
When a patient suspects she is pregnant, or has been confirmed to be 
pregnant either from a test taken at the clinic or before coming to the 
clinic and she seeks prenatal care, abortion services, or other 
counseling related to her pregnancy, the clinic must inform her: (1) if 
the clinic is licensed or unlicensed; (2) if the clinic provides abortion; 
(3) that she may qualify for public programs that provide immediate 
free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services 
(including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, 
and abortion for eligible women; and (4) that to determine whether she 
qualifies, she must contact the county social services office. 
By tying the notice to a confirmed or suspected pregnancy and the 
medical counseling related to her suspected or confirmed pregnancy, the 
FACT Act could be interpreted as a constitutional regulation of 
professional conduct and would allow states to regulate the deceptive 
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practices of CPCs once and for all. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit should find that the FACT Act fails strict scrutiny 
because it was not narrowly tailored.  Regardless of the Ninth Circuit’s 
finding, physicians may now have a better chance to challenge 
paternalistic informed consent laws on abortion because of NIFLA.  This 
may have the potential to invalidate abortion informed consent laws but 
uphold future laws that regulate CPCs. 
Informed consent requires the discussion of the risks and benefits of 
procedures and treatment.320  While the words “truth,” “facts,” or “free of 
ideology” are nowhere to be found, a plain reading of the informed 
consent standard makes clear that in order for a patient to make an 
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